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STANDING UP FOR CONSUMERS: WHETHER THIRD PARTY 
PAYORS CAN ESTABLISH STANDING TO SUE AGAINST DRUG 
MANUFACTURERS UNDER CIVIL RICO 
Brianna Vollman1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
More than 131 million Americans use prescription drugs.2 Third-party 
payors (“TPPs”), such as health insurance companies, pay for the majority 
of the cost of these prescriptions; 91.5 percent of Americans had health 
insurance in 2018.3  
In recent years, TPPs have discovered a new avenue of bringing suit 
against untruthful drug manufacturers: the civil provision in the Racketeer 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Under that statute, TPPs bring 
suit against drug manufacturers who either misrepresent the safety of a 
drug or promote off-label uses. The TPPs allege they have incurred 
significant financial losses paying for the relevant drug, as opposed to 
another, sometimes cheaper version.  
TPPs are fighting for their right to bring suit and hold untruthful drug 
manufacturers accountable. The TPPs, though, have an uphill battle. Drug 
manufacturers argue that because TPPs cannot show proximate cause or 
establish a proper causal connection between the monetary loss and the 
alleged fraudulent scheme, the TPPs do not have standing to sue. The 
United States Courts of Appeals have reached an express disagreement 
about whether TPPs have established proximate cause. This Article 
argues that TPPs have properly established proximate cause and are 
properly bringing RICO suits against drug manufacturers.  
Part II of this Article examines the doctrine of standing to sue and the 
legislative history of the civil provision of RICO. Next, Part II reviews 
Supreme Court precedent and the current jurisprudence of federal circuit 
courts regarding TPPs bringing suit against drug manufacturers. Part III 
then argues that TPPs have properly established proximate cause and have 
standing to sue drug manufacturers in the relevant circumstances. Part III 
ends with a brief overview of important policy considerations. Part IV 
concludes by asserting the necessity of truthfulness in drug manufacturing 
in order to protect the American consumer. 
 
 1. University of Cincinnati Law Review, Associate Member 
 2.  Prescription Drugs, GEO. U.: HEALTH POL’Y INST., https://hpi.georgetown.edu/rxdrugs/# 
[https://perma.cc/55ZZ-APGZ]. 
 3. EDWARD R. BERCHICK, JESSICA C. BARNETT & RACHEL D. UPTON, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-267 (RV), HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 2018 (Nov. 9, 2019), available athttps://www.census.gov/library/publications/2019/demo/p60-
267.html [https://perma.cc/EJD4-X8XM]. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Section A of Part II briefly summarizes the extensive history and 
evolution of the concept of standing to sue. Section B discusses the 
legislative history of RICO, summarizes the RICO statutes, and discusses 
various modern applications of RICO. Next, Section C covers Supreme 
Court precedent on issues related to TPPs’ RICO suits against drug 
manufactures. Finally, Section D focuses on the current federal circuit 
split on the issue of whether TPPs can adequately establish standing and 
proximate cause under civil RICO against pharmaceutical manufacturers 
that fail to disclose certain health risks or urge certain uses of drugs not 
yet approved by the Federal Drug Administration (“FDA”). 
A. Standing to Sue  
Article III of the United States Constitution specifies the jurisdiction of 
federal courts, rendering these courts of limited jurisdiction.4 Article III 
grants the federal courts jurisdiction over specific “cases” and 
“controversies.”5 The Supreme Court of the United States has wrestled 
for decades with these enigmatic terms, reaching back to Chief Justice 
Marshall’s famous opinion in Marbury v. Madison.6 The Chief Justice 
described Article III limitations on federal courts, explaining that a court 
has the power to declare a statute unconstitutional only if the case is 
properly before it.7  
From the “cases or controversies” doctrine came another enigmatic 
term: standing. The doctrine of standing defines an Article III “case or 
controversy.”8 Standing to sue particularly focuses on the parties before 
the court, and whether the parties have suffered a direct injury that can be 
properly addressed by the court.9 The “irreducible constitutional 
minimum” of standing has three elements: (1) the plaintiff has suffered a 
concrete injury; (2) that injury is fairly traceable to actions of the 
defendant; and (3) it must be likely—not merely speculative—that the 
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.10 The type of injury 
 
 4. Anthony M. O'Connor Jr., Federal Courts: Standing to Sue, 1985 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 179, 
179-80 (1985). 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 6. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 173-74 (1803). 
 7. Id. at 147. “The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one supreme 
court, and such inferior courts as congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. This power is 
expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and consequently, in some 
form, may be exercised over the present *174 case; because the right claimed is given by a law of the 
United States.” 
 8. O’Connor, supra note 4, at 179-80. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
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needed to invoke jurisdiction of the federal courts has been described as, 
“some direct injury as the result of [a statute’s] enforcement, and not 
merely that [the plaintiff] suffers in some indefinite way in common with 
people generally.”11 This sort of injury is often called an “injury in fact.”12 
Circuit courts disagree about whether “but-for” causation is sufficient for 
Article III standing or if the Constitution also requires proximate 
causation.13 Generally, though, a plaintiff must “allege personal injury 
fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely 
to be redressed by the requested relief."14 These two types of causation 
are discussed in depth in the next two sections dealing with the RICO 
statute and Supreme Court precedent. For the third element, the Supreme 
Court has insisted that there must be a “substantial likelihood” that the 
relief sought from a court, if granted, would remedy the harm.15  
Put more concisely, in order to have Article III standing, a plaintiff 
must have suffered some actual or threatened injury, which can fairly be 
traced to the defendant and is likely to be redressed by a favorable 
decision by the court. 
B. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
1. Legislative History 
RICO’s purpose is the “elimination of the infiltration of organized 
crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in 
interstate commerce.”16 Organized crime was an issue in the forefront of 
the 1960s and 1970s, the decades leading up to the enactment of the RICO 
statute.17 The Kefauver Committee, which the United States Senate 
appointed to conduct a study on organized crime, concluded that a 
separate supplement to federal antitrust law was needed to address the 
 
 11. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).  
 12. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &State, 454 U.S. 464, 
472 (1982). 
 13. Compare Lac Du Flambeau Band of  Lake  Superior  Chippewa  Indians  v.  Norton,  422  F.3d  
490,  500-01  (7th  Cir.  2005), and Loggerhead Turtle v. Cnty. Council of Volusia Cnty., Fla., 148 F.3d 
1231, 1247 (11th Cir. 1998), and Amador  Cnty.,  Cal.  v.  Salazar,  640  F.3d  373,  378  (D.C. Cir. 2011), 
and The  Pitt  News  v.  Fisher,  215  F.3d  354,  361 (3d Cir. 2000), and Ivy v. Williams, 781 F.3d 250, 
253 (5th Cir. 2015), with Nat'l  Council  of  La  Raza  v.  Mukasey,  283  Fed.  App’x  848,  851-52  (2d  
Cir. 2008), and Frank Krasner Enter., Ltd. v.  Montgomery  Cnty.,  Md.,  401  F.3d  230,  236  (4th  Cir. 
2005), and San Diego Cnty. Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 14. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).   
 15. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79, 75 n.20 (1978) (plaintiff 
must show “substantial likelihood” that relief requested will redress the injury).  
 16. PAUL BATISTA, CIV. RICO PRACTICE MANUAL § 2.04 (2007). 
 17. Craig M. Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. 
REV. 837, 837-39 (1980). 
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issue of businesses being affected by criminal methods.18   
During Congressional debates, the scope of RICO slowly began to 
broaden. The bill’s original stated purpose was “[t]o aid in the pressing 
need to remove organized crime from legitimate organizations in our 
country. . . .”19 Lawmakers specifically wanted to allow litigants to reach 
the financial power of organized crime members, leading to the proposal 
of the civil remedy provision discussed in the next subsection of this 
Article.20 Some lawmakers argued for a more expansive application, 
recognizing that adding a civil remedy would significantly broaden the 
scope of the original bill.21 Yet, the civil remedy remained and is found 
in the statute today.22  
2. The Statutes 
RICO contains eight sections. Section 1962 of RICO makes it unlawful 
for any person to receive or maintain an interest in an enterprise engaged 
in interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering23 activity or 
through collection of unlawful debt.24 The statute also makes it unlawful 
to have any interest in or control of such an enterprise.25 Notably, there 
are no express limitations on the statutes’ application.26 Consistent with 
Congress’s intent to defeat organized crime, Section 1963 contains 
criminal penalties for a violation of Section 1962 up to 20 years in prison, 
a monetary fine, or both.27  
The statute also contains a civil cause of action.28 Section 1964 of 
RICO states that any person injured in his business or property by reason 
of a violation of Section 1962 may bring suit in a federal district court and 
potentially recover threefold the damages sustained, the cost of the suit, 
 
 18. Batista, supra note 16. The Kefauver Committee was the first modern group to study organized 
crime in a systematic fashion. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Danene Tushar, RICO - Standing to Sue and Something More: Civil Claims under Rico in the 
Eighth Circuit, 18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1283, 1284 (1984). 
 21. Batista, supra note 16.  
 22. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 
 23. Section 1961 of RICO provides an expansive definition of “racketeering,” in relevant part as 
follows, “(1) “racketeering activity” means “… (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following 
provisions of title 18, United States Code:… Section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), Section 1343 (relating 
to wire fraud)…” The relevant parts of the mail fraud statute and wire fraud statute deal with using such 
services to introduce false representations. 
 24. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1970). 
 25. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1970). 
 26. Tushar, supra note 20. 
 27. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1970). 
 28. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1970). 
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and attorney’s fees.29 Put simply, a plaintiff bringing suit under civil 
RICO must show: 1) a violation of Section 1962(a), (b), (c), or (d); (2) 
injury to her business or property; and (3) causation of the injury by the 
violation.30 As Supreme Court precedent has revealed, the statute’s 
application isn’t as straight forward as it may seem at first glance. 
The RICO statutes require causation. In RICO, two types of causation 
are required. The first is called but-for causation, which requires a simple 
inquiry: but-for the defendant’s negligence or wrongful act, would the 
plaintiff have suffered this injury?31 This is also called “actual cause” or 
“cause in fact.”32 The second required causal link is "proximate cause,” 
which determines whether the injury was the natural and probable 
consequence of the wrongful act, without any effective intervening 
causes.33  
3. Modern Applications 
The civil remedy provision of RICO lay dormant for almost a decade 
before becoming used as a vehicle for a variety of civil claims.34 In 1998, 
the Supreme Court allowed a pro-choice activist group to maintain a civil 
RICO claim against anti-abortion groups seeking to close abortion clinics, 
holding that civil RICO contains no economic motive requirement.35 
Another unique attempted use of a civil RICO claim involved union 
health funds and hospitals seeking to recover the costs of treating tobacco-
related illnesses from tobacco companies.36 Finally, TPPs like union 
health and welfare funds have brought suit under the civil remedy 
provision of RICO against pharmaceutical companies that allegedly failed 
to disclose certain health risks or urged non-FDA approved uses of certain 
drugs.37 Some of these RICO applications, although not originally 
contemplated, have proven to be an effective way to address crimes that 
fall outside the usual realm of organized crime. The following Sections 
discuss the civil RICO provision in the context of TPPs and drug 
 
 29. Id. (emphasis added). 
 30. Ross Bagley, Dorian Hurley & Peter Mancuso, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 901, 942-43 (2007). 
 31. 74 AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 26 (1962). 
 32. Id. 
 33. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 188 (1936). 
 34. Tushar, supra note 20, at 1283. 
 35. Nat'l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 262, 262 n.6 (1994) (“We hold only that 
RICO contains no economic motive requirement.”). 
 36. Bagley, supra note 30, at 949-51. See Laborers Loc. 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 239-41 (2d Cir. 1999). In this case, though, the Second Circuit determined 
that those brining the suit did not have standing under civil RICO. 
 37. See In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2013).. 
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manufacturers.  
C. Supreme Court Precedent 
The Supreme Court has given guidance on how the civil provision of 
RICO should be applied. A prominent civil RICO case in 1992 dealt with 
RICO’s causation element.38 In Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation, the Court determined that in order to have standing under 
the civil provision of RICO, litigants must meet the requirements of both 
but-for causation and proximate causation.39 The proximate cause 
requirement, the Court opined, demands a direct relation between the 
asserted injury and the alleged wrongful conduct.40 The Court established 
three factors upon which the “direct relation” requirement is based:  
First, the less direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain 
the amount of a plaintiff's damages attributable to the violation, as distinct 
from other, independent, factors. Second, quite apart from problems of 
proving factual causation, recognizing claims of the indirectly injured 
would force courts to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages 
among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violative 
acts, to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries. And, finally, the need to 
grapple with these problems is simply unjustified by the general interest in 
deterring injurious conduct, since directly injured victims can generally be 
counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general, without any 
of the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely.41 
The Supreme Court cited this language in each subsequent civil RICO 
case that came before it.42 Holmes dealt specifically with securities fraud 
and held that the link between the alleged stock manipulation and the 
asserted losses to non-purchasing customers was too remote to satisfy 
proximate cause.43 
Next, the Court in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corporation determined 
that a steel mill product manufacturer did not have standing to sue its 
competitors who were not charging their customers New York State sales 
tax.44 Although the steel mill asserted competitors not charging their 
customers sales tax caused the mill to lose customers and profit, the Court 
held that the true injured party was the State of New York.45 The main 
 
 38. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267-68 (1992). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at. 268. 
 41. Id. at 269-70 (internal citation omitted). 
 42. Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co. Ltd., 943 
F.3d 1243, 1249 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 43. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268-69. 
 44. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 457-48 (2006). 
 45. Id. at 458. 
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problem was that the injury (losing customers) was entirely distinct from 
the competitors defrauding the State of New York.46 The Supreme Court 
once again emphasized the need for a direct relation between the conduct 
and the subsequent injury.  
In a 2010 case, Hemi Group v. City of New York, New York, the City 
of New York brought a civil RICO action against an out-of-state cigarette 
retailer that sent cigarettes directly to residents, thus circumventing the 
$1.50-per-pack tax imposed by the city.47 The Supreme Court determined 
that the link between an out-of-state retailer’s failure to properly inform 
New York City about the identity of the retailer’s customers and New 
York City’s loss of cigarette tax proceeds was too attenuated to satisfy 
proximate cause.48 The Court determined that the true cause of New York 
City’s loss was residents within the city failing to pay taxes as required.49 
Another prominent case in the Court’s civil RICO jurisprudence dealt 
with an alleged scheme to use multiple agents to circumvent a county’s 
one-bidder-per-tax-lien auction rule.50 The defendants allegedly used 
agents to submit simultaneous bids, leading to the defendants receiving a 
higher share of tax liens at the county auction.51 The plaintiffs, property 
owners in Cook County, Illinois, alleged that these deceptive practices 
deprived them of their fair share of tax liens.52 Defendants argued that if 
the allegations were true, the misrepresentations were made to the county, 
not the plaintiffs suing.53 However, the Supreme Court determined that it 
was a foreseeable consequence of the defendants’ scheme that the 
plaintiffs and other similarly situated bidders would receive less than their 
fair share of liens.54 Further, unlike the situations in Anza and Hemi 
Group, no other parties suffered more direct injuries than the plaintiffs.55 
The Supreme Court deemed that the plaintiff properly alleged proximate 
cause.56  
Overall, the Supreme Court has determined that in order to bring a civil 
RICO claim, the plaintiff must be able to properly allege but-for causation 
and proximate causation. In order to do so, courts should consider whether 
there is a direct relation between the alleged RICO violation and the 
subsequent harm. Courts should use the three factors laid out in Holmes 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Hemi Grp. v. City of New York, N.Y., 559 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2010). 
 48. Id. at 11. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 643 (2008). 
 51. Id. at 643-44. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 648. 
 54. Id. at 658. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 661. 
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to determine whether such direct relation existed.57  
D. The Circuit Split 
The federal circuit courts disagree about whether TPPs like health 
insurance companies and health and welfare funds have standing under 
RICO to sue drug manufacturers that allegedly fail to disclose serious 
health risks or promote non-FDA-approved uses of certain drugs. The 
First, Third, and Ninth Circuits agree that TPPs have standing to sue drug 
manufacturers under RICO. The Second and Seventh Circuits disagree. 
This Section will take each relevant case in turn. 
1. TPP Formularies 
Before discussing the relevant case law, the intricate methodology of 
determining which drugs TPPs will cover warrants discussion. A 
formulary is a list of medications, created by TPPs, that physicians may 
prescribe to the TPPs’ members.58 Whether a TPP will cover the cost of 
a member’s prescription depends on whether the drug is listed on the 
TPP’s formulary.59 Often, formularies are prepared through rigorous 
research regarding a drug’s cost efficiency, advantages and disadvantages 
of competing drugs, and the particular drug’s efficacy.60 Weighing all 
these factors, if a TPP determines that one drug is “better” than the other, 
the drug receives preferred status; thus, the TPP is more likely to cover 
the costs of that drug.61 The FDA only approves certain medical 
conditions that a drug may be used to treat, and drug manufacturers can 
only promote those uses.62 Physicians, though, may prescribe the drug for 
off-label conditions or a condition that has not been approved by the FDA 
for the drug to treat.63 Some cases deal with a drug manufacturer’s 
promotion of off-label uses, and some deal with nondisclosure of certain 
health risks induced by the manufactured drug. This process is highly 
relevant to a court’s determination of the existence of proximate cause.  
2. Finding Proximate Cause 
The First Circuit dealt directly with the issue of a TPP suing a 
 
 57. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267-69 (1992). 
 58. In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 59. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 634 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 635. 
 62. Sidney Hillman Health Ctr. of Rochester v. Abbott Labs., 873 F.3d 574, 575 (7th Cir. 2017) 
 63. Id. 
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pharmaceutical manufacturer in In re Neurontin.64 Kaiser, a major health 
plan provider and insurer, sued Pfizer, the manufacturer of a drug called 
Neurontin, for introducing the prescription of the drug for off-label uses.65 
Kaiser alleged that in order to increase Neurontin’s earning potential, 
Pfizer developed a fraudulent marketing strategy to encourage TPPs like 
Kaiser to allow the drug to be prescribed for non-FDA approved uses.66 
Kaiser alleged that Pfizer misrepresented the efficacy of the drug’s off-
label uses.67 The “fraudulent scheme” was evidenced by Pfizer’s 
marketing team’s “Operation Plan” and other evidence.68 Pfizer, however,  
alleged that Kaiser could not satisfy proximate cause.69  
The First Circuit ruled in favor of the TPP, stating that Kaiser had met 
both the direct relationship requirement and the three Holmes factors.70 
The court explained that Pfizer “ha[d] always known that, because of the 
structure of the American health care system, physicians would not be the 
ones paying for the drugs they prescribed.”71 The court determined that 
the fraudulent scheme indeed caused injury to Kaiser because Neurontin, 
a more expensive drug, was prescribed more often for off-label uses due 
to Pfizer’s marketing scheme.72 Overall, doctors prescribing the drug did 
not sever the causal chain between Pfizer’s RICO violation and Kaiser’s 
injury.73 
In the case of In re Avandia, the Third Circuit faced a similar inquiry 
in a case where the drug manufacturer allegedly misrepresented heart-
related safety risks of the drug Avandia, a drug used to treat diabetes.74 
Despite the FDA instructing the drug manufacturer to stop minimizing 
the heart-related health risks in its marketing, the manufacturer widely 
distributed a campaign attempting to debunk studies that showed how 
dangerous Avandia was.75 Avandia was significantly more expensive than 
other leading diabetes drugs of a similar kind, and the plaintiffs alleged 
that the manufacturer misrepresented the risks of the drug in an attempt 
to get Avandia on TPP formularies.76 Thus, certain TPPs sued the 
manufacturer for failure to disclose the heart-related risks, which 
 
 64. In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at. 27-28. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 28. 
 69. Id. at 34. 
 70. Id. at 38. 
 71. Id. at 38-39. 
 72. Id. at 39. 
 73. Id. 
 74. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 634-36 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 75. Id. at 635. 
 76. Id. at 636. 
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predicated multiple RICO violations.77 The manufacturer alleged that the 
TPPs did not adequately allege standing.78  
The Third Circuit determined that the TPPs had satisfied the Supreme 
Court’s direct relation requirement because “the plaintiff’s injuries are the 
same conduct forming the basis of the RICO scheme alleged in the 
complaint . . . .”79 Applying the Holmes factors, the court determined that 
the plaintiffs were best situated to sue and that it would not be too difficult 
to establish damages.80 The Third Circuit acknowledged that an injury to 
one person caused by the wrongs of another can satisfy proximate cause, 
according to the Supreme Court’s holding in Bridge v. Phoenix Bond.81 
Like the First Circuit, the Third Circuit determined that prescribing 
physicians did not break the chain of causation and that the proximate 
cause requirement of civil RICO was satisfied.82  
The Ninth Circuit most recently faced this standing inquiry in 
December 2019.83 In Painters v. Takeda, a health insurer sued a 
pharmaceutical company for failing to change the label on the diabetes 
drug Actos to warn that the drug caused an increased risk of bladder 
cancer.84 Multiple studies revealed the risk of taking Actos, but the 
pharmaceutical company, Takeda, allegedly failed to inform the public of 
such risk.85 Over a decade after FDA approval and in light of further 
studies alleging the same risk, the FDA released a public warning about 
Actos.86 After this warning, sales plummeted by a total of eighty 
percent.87 The insurance company brought suit against Takeda and sought 
to recover economic damages for payments made to purchase the drug for 
its members.88 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the First and Third Circuits, and 
determined that the physicians served as mere intermediaries in 
prescribing the drug.89 Since Actos is a prescription drug that must be 
prescribed by physicians, it was “perfectly foreseeable” that physicians 
 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 637. 
 79. Id. at 644. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 645 (citing Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 650, 658 (2008)). 
 82. Id. at 645-46. 
 83. Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co. Ltd., 943 
F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1247. 
 89. Id. at 1257. 
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would be involved along the causal chain.90 Because the insurance 
company alleged that they would not have paid for the drug had it known 
of the risks, as evidenced by the plummet in sales after the FDA warning, 
the insurance company was a directly injured victim of Takeda’s conduct 
that constituted a RICO violation.91  
Overall, courts that find the proximate cause requirement satisfied 
follow a similar analysis: (1) whether all of the Holmes direct relation 
factors fall in favor of proximate cause; (2) whether injury can be proven 
because the TPP paid more for the dangerous drug over another, or would 
not have listed the drug on the formulary at all; and (3) whether it can be 
determined that physicians are not effective intervening causes.  
3. Against the Existence of Proximate Cause 
The Second and Seventh Circuits have strikingly different views on the 
issue of TPPs alleging proximate cause. The Second Circuit faced similar 
facts as the other circuit courts, although arising from an appeal of class 
certification.92 A TPP sought damages for paying for a higher priced drug 
that proved to have a dangerous side effect.93 The pharmaceutical 
company, Lilly, allegedly misrepresented the drug’s efficacy and 
promoted off-label uses, despite lack of evidence that the drug was 
effective for such uses.94 The plaintiff’s TPP alleged two different 
theories of damages: (1) the insurance company charged higher prices for 
the drug based on Lilly’s misrepresentation, coined the “excessive price 
theory,” and (2) the insurance company paid for prescriptions of the drug 
“that would not have been issued but for the misrepresentations,” called 
the “quantity effect theory.”95 The lower court certified the class based on 
the excessive price theory, and Lilly appealed.96  
The Second Circuit determined that the plaintiffs’ injuries under both 
theories were too attenuated to satisfy proximate cause.97 Because the 
manufacturer’s alleged misrepresentation was not the only source of 
information physicians used when prescribing drugs, the causal chain was 
broken by “independent actions of third and even fourth parties.”98 
Notably, the Second Circuit did a deep dive into the structure of TPPs and 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. Interestingly, five patients without insurance who paid out of pocket for the drug sued 
alongside the insurance company and succeeded. 
 92. UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 93. Id. at 123. 
 94. Id. at 124. 
 95. Id. at 129. 
 96. Id. at 130. 
 97. Id. at 136. 
 98. Id. at 134-35. 
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who within the TPP actually determines what drugs end up on the 
company’s formulary.99 Because a “pharmacy benefit manager” and that 
manager’s committee also made determinations as to what drugs ended 
up on the formulary, the chain of causation was broken in multiple places 
by too many independent judgments to satisfy proximate cause.100 
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the conclusion that a TPP claiming 
damages against a drug manufacturer for promoting off-label uses did not 
satisfy proximate cause as mandated by RICO.101 Because the patients 
who were prescribed the dangerous drug were the most directly injured 
parties—not TPPs—the court determined that TPPs were far beyond the 
“first step” in the causal chain.102 Further, the drug manufacturer’s 
misrepresentations were made primarily to the physicians, not TPPs.103 
Because there was no guarantee that doctors changed their prescribing 
practice as a result of the manufacturer’s misrepresentations, the alleged 
damages would have been too difficult to calculate.104  
The circuits are split on whether TPPs have standing to sue a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer for misrepresentations on labels or for 
urging off-label uses of certain drugs. This issue will remain relevant in 
light of the widespread use of prescription drugs and impeding changes 
within the American health care system due to the election of President 
Biden. Therefore, this legal struggle between TPPs and pharmaceutical 
manufacturers will remain relevant for years to come.  
III. DISCUSSION 
The weight of relevant case law supports the conclusion that proximate 
cause exists between TPPs and pharmaceutical companies when 
pharmaceutical companies misrepresent health risks or encourage off-
label usage of a drug. First, Section A highlights the flaws of the Second 
and Seventh Circuit’s arguments against the existence of proximate cause. 
Section B discusses arguments supporting the existence of proximate 
cause, including the issues of standing and the statutory text of RICO. 
Section C discusses the important policy considerations at play. 
 
 99. Id. at 126. 
 100. Id. at 134. 
 101. Sidney Hillman Health Ctr. of Rochester v. Abbott Labs., 873 F.3d 574, 576-77 (7th Cir. 
2017). 
 102. Id. at 576 (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258,  271-72 (1992)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 577-78. 
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A. Missteps of the Second and Seventh Circuits 
The Second and Seventh Circuits, when determining that the TPP did 
not meet the requirement of proximate cause, were faced with the issue at 
different stages in litigation. The Second Circuit considered the issue at 
the class certification stage, while the Seventh Circuit entertained the 
issue at the pleadings stage.105 Regardless of this technical difference, the 
two courts used similar reasoning in reaching the conclusion that 
proximate cause was not met in either case. 
The courts focused first on the causal chain. Both courts extended the 
causal chain in a way not contemplated by the doctrine of proximate 
cause. For example, the Second Circuit stretched the chain, diving into 
the structure of TPP decision-making.106 The court discussed the inner 
workings of TPPs in its unnecessary discussion of Pharmacy Benefit 
Managers (“PBMs”) and their committees.107 The court considered how 
a particular manager made recommendations about the what drugs to put 
on the TPP’s formulary and whether this was an intervening cause 
severing the chain of causation.108 The Second Circuit further held that 
the TPP failed to negotiate lower prices for the drug, reaching once again 
to create an intervening cause.109  
The Seventh Circuit similarly emphasized the independent decisions of 
physicians, explaining that these decisions severed the causal chain.110 
The court opined that there was no way to know if some of the off-label 
prescriptions were actually helpful to the patient or whether the 
physicians were also influenced by other information sources, not just the 
pharmaceutical company’s fraudulent marketing scheme.111 
Both courts’ discussion of PBMs, physicians, and other alleged 
intervening causes detract from the main tenant of the proximate cause 
doctrine: foreseeability. Standing necessarily looks to the parties of the 
case. In each case, a TPP alleged that the drug manufacturer conducted a 
fraudulent scheme that cost the TPP money. The pharmaceutical 
companies absolutely were aware, due to the structure of the American 
health care system, that TPPs would be the entities paying for the drugs. 
This is not to say that the adverse effects on patients and loss of business 
for physicians were unworthy of litigation–these injuries were jarring in 
their own right. But they did not attenuate the causal chain so far as to 
 
 105. Lilly, 620 F.3d at 129; Sidney Hillman, 873 F.3d at 575-76. 
 106. Lilly, 630 F.3d at 126. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 134. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Sidney Hillman, 873 F.3d at 576-77. 
 111. Id. 
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render the TPPs without a proper proximate cause argument.  
Further, these courts omitted most of the controlling law of the Holmes 
direct relations factors from their discussions and analysis.112 This was 
likely because in each case, the Holmes factors would have debunked the 
courts’ ultimate holdings.  Yet, the Holmes factors continue to remain 
important, and later Sections in this Article illustrate how the Holmes 
factors favor finding proximate cause in these situations. 
Finding that TPPs can assert a direct relation between the asserted 
injury and injurious conduct alleged is not only supported by the factors 
laid out in Holmes, but also the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bridge. A 
unanimous decision in Bridge explained that proximate cause is a 
“flexible concept that does not lend itself to a black-letter rule that will 
dictate the result in every case.” 113 The Second and Seventh Circuits were 
trying to read proximate cause far too literally, practically determining 
that each human being involved in a transaction who makes a decision 
breaks the causal chain. The Supreme Court expressly rejected such an 
attempt to read a bright-line rule into the proximate cause doctrine.114 
Further, the Court explained that “the common law has long recognized 
that plaintiffs can recover in a variety of circumstances where . . . their 
injuries result directly from the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations 
to a third party.”115 This debunks the Seventh Circuit’s argument 
determining that the TPP does not have standing to sue if the 
misrepresentations were made to physicians, not directly to the TPP.  
Standing and proximate cause are some of the hurdles plaintiffs must 
surpass to bring suit. The pharmaceutical company is still able to fight the 
allegations on their merits. On the whole, in light of the Holmes factors, 
foreseeability, and the Court’s decision in Bridge, the TPPs in these cases 
allege a direct enough injury to at least be able to present their case in 
court. The Supreme Court has made clear that proximate cause is flexible; 
therefore, the Second and Seventh Circuits’ attempts to create a much 
stricter, sole cause requirement does not bode well.  
B. Existence of Proximate Cause and Supporting Explanations 
Having already pointed out the issues with the Second and Seventh 
Circuits’ justifications, this Article will examine the arguments that 
support the opposite conclusion—namely, the First, Third, and Ninth 
Circuits’ holdings. This Section discusses multiple issues, each 
supporting the conclusion that TPPs have standing to sue pharmaceutical 
 
 112. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992). 
 113. Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 654 (2008). 
 114. Id. at 659. 
 115. Id. at 653. 
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companies that commit fraudulent misrepresentations. Subsection 1 
discusses the injury aspect of the standing doctrine. Subsection 2 
discusses the causation aspect of standing. Finally, Subsection 3 discusses 
the statutory text of RICO. 
1. Injury 
One aspect of standing is injury-in-fact, which is “some direct injury 
as the result of [a statute’s] enforcement and not merely that [the plaintiff] 
suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.”116 
Section 1964(c) of the RICO statute specifically requires an injury to 
business or property caused by the defendant’s violation of the statute.117 
Notably, injury to person is left out of the statute’s text. The Ninth Circuit, 
in past opinions, has interpreted the lack of recovery for personal injury 
as having a “restrictive significance, which helps to assure that RICO is 
not expanded to provide a federal cause of action and treble damages to 
every tort plaintiff.”118 The Seventh Circuit posits that patients may 
receive adverse care due to fraudulent pharmaceutical marketing 
strategies, and thus their injury is more direct than the TTPs.119 But, as 
made clear by the statute’s language, patients cannot sue for physical 
harm due to RICO violations. Perhaps the patients may sue under 
malpractice law, but in an assessment of RICO and who is in the best spot 
to sue under this statute, the patient should not be a factor. Any discussion 
of adverse effects on a patient’s health, although entirely worthy of 
concern, is an unsuccessful attempt to pinpoint an intervening cause and 
break the causal chain. But regarding injury-in-fact, and specifically when 
assessing RICO standing, courts should look to the parties in the case and 
determine whether the TPP suffered injury because of the RICO violation. 
In order to have standing under civil RICO, “a showing of injury 
requires proof of a concrete financial loss and not mere injury to a 
valuable intangible property interest.”120 Injury can be shown by 
allegations and proof of actual monetary loss.121 Concrete injury will not 
be found if the economic harm is contingent on some future event that 
something might occur.122 When TPPs sue pharmaceutical companies 
under RICO, the injury is not contingent upon “the effectiveness of the 
 
 116. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 489 (1923).  
 117. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (West). 
 118. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 638 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(quoting Steele v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 36 F.3d 69, 70 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 119. Sidney Hillman Health Ctr. of Rochester v. Abbott Labs., 873 F.3d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 120. Avandia, 804 F.3d at 638 (quoting Steele v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 36 F.3d 69, 70 (9th Cir. 
1994)). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id.at 639. 
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[drug] that they purchased, but rather on the inflationary effect that [the 
pharmaceutical company’s] allegedly fraudulent behavior had on the 
price of [the drug].”123 Thus, TPPs satisfy the injury aspect of standing if 
they can show economic loss attributable to the drug at issue. 
2. Causation 
The Holmes court explained that the civil RICO statute requires a 
showing of both but-for causation and proximate causation.124 These are 
two separate burdens that the plaintiff must show to properly bring a 
RICO claim before the court. But first, a discussion of damage theories is 
helpful to grasp the underpinning of proximate cause issues in the cases. 
Next, this Section will address proximate cause, as it is the most hotly 
debated aspect of RICO standing. Finally, this Section will discuss but-
for causation.  
 i. Damage Theories 
Courts often conflate the finding of proximate cause with the 
calculation of damages. Although related, the Third Circuit correctly 
stated, “[t]his issue of damages, rather than demonstrating the lack of 
proximate causation, raises an issue of proof regarding the overall 
numbers of prescriptions or amounts of price inflation attributable to [the 
pharmaceutical company’s] action. This is a question of damages and, 
more specifically, a question for another day.”125 While this is true, it is 
helpful to explain a few theories of damages that plaintiffs have used. In 
Lilly, which dealt with fraudulent misrepresentation about the safety of a 
drug, the plaintiffs asserted two theories of damages.126 First, the quantity 
effect theory dealt with the sentiment that such a large amount of 
prescriptions for the drug at issue would not have been written absent the 
fraud.127 The second theory, the excessive price theory, explained that due 
to the misrepresentation of the safety of the drug, the health insurer set an 
excessively high price for the drug, causing economic loss.128 These two 
themes, inflated quantity and excessive price, are found in each case, 
either mentioned briefly or expounded upon at length.  
The amount of consideration given to damages most likely has more to 
do with litigation strategy as opposed to the standing inquiry. Likely, 
 
 123. Id. at 640. 
 124. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992). 
 125. Avandia, 804 F.3d at 644. 
 126. UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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theories of damages were presented to satisfy the first of three Holmes 
factors, which deals with the ability to “ascertain the amount of damages 
attributable to the violation as distinct from other independent factors.”129 
Yet, this Holmes factor is indeed satisfied. The Court has since clarified 
this discussion of the connection between the violation and the damages. 
In Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply, the Supreme Court explained that proximate 
cause would be lacking where the conduct directly causing the injury is 
distinct from the actions that gave rise to the fraud.130 In the cases 
discussed herein, the injury, economic loss, is not distinct from the 
fraudulent marketing campaigns giving rise to RICO violations. Thus, the 
first Holmes factor is satisfied, and any further discussion of the 
complicated damage theories is unnecessary. As the Ninth Circuit stated, 
ascertaining damages is not so difficult that plaintiffs “should be denied 
the opportunity to prove their damages.”131 
ii. Proximate Cause 
The Supreme Court has explained that proximate cause is used “to limit 
a person’s responsibility for the consequences of that person’s acts.”132 
The Court explained that proximate cause has developed from common 
law,133 which describes proximate cause as an inquiry as to whether the 
injury was the natural and probable consequence of the wrongful act, 
without any effective intervening cause.134 Although the doctrine has 
taken many “shapes,” the doctrine generally is “a demand for some direct 
relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”135 
The foreseeability of the harm is also part of the analysis, where an injury 
will be considered a direct result if “it was a foreseeable and natural 
consequence” of the conduct that constitutes a RICO violation.136 
An interesting aspect of proximate cause, which is specific to 
misrepresentations, is the requirement of reliance on those 
misrepresentations. The Supreme Court in Bridge explained that if there 
is a sufficiently direct relationship between the defendant’s wrongful 
conduct and the plaintiff’s injury, a RICO plaintiff need not directly rely 
on a defendant’s misrepresentations to establish proximate cause.137 If 
 
 129. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269. 
 130. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 458 (2006). 
 131. Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co. Ltd., 943 
F.3d 1243, 1251 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 132. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268. 
 133. Id. 
 134. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 188 (1936). 
 135. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268-69. 
 136. Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 658 (2008). 
 137. Id. at 657-58. 
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there are intermediaries involved in the causal chain, the chain does not 
break even though the plaintiffs were not the subject of the 
misrepresentations, so long as the plaintiffs were “the primary and 
intended victims of the scheme to defraud.”138 
The three factors set out in Holmes are described in many ways. The 
factors have been described as the “three reasons behind the requirements 
of a directness relationship between the injury and conduct alleged.”139 
The factors have also been described as “three functional factors with 
which to assess whether proximate cause exists under RICO.”140 In a 
word, the factors serve as guideposts to assess the facts of a case. The 
existence of factors show in itself that this concept is pliable and not 
meant to impose a bright-line test.  
The Holmes factors have already been discussed briefly, but a summary 
may be helpful to preface the discussion of the cases finding proximate 
cause. The first Holmes factor is difficulty in ascertaining damages due to 
indirectness of injury.141 The second factor deals with the risk of multiple 
recoveries due to multiple parties being injured.142 And finally, the third 
factor calls upon courts to consider whether holding the defendant liable 
justifies the general interest of deterring injurious conduct or whether 
there are more directly injured victims that are better suited to hold the 
defendant accountable.143 
The First, Third, and Ninth Circuits properly apply the doctrine of 
proximate cause. While there are quite a few factual differences between 
the cases, the main dispute is “whether the decisions of prescribing 
physicians and pharmacy benefit managers constitute intervening causes 
that sever the chain of proximate cause between the drug manufacturer 
and TPP.”144 Notably, the pharmaceutical companies did not argue that 
the intermediary action of physicians caused the TPP’s injury.145 In each 
case, the injury alleged by a TPP was an economic injury independent of 
any physical injury suffered by patients for off-label prescriptions or 
undisclosed health risks.146 This is the direct relation that Holmes and 
Bridge were concerned with: that the injury arose out of the alleged RICO 
violation.  
The Ninth Circuit correctly characterized prescribing physicians as 
 
 138. Id. at 658. 
 139. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 642 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 140. In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 141. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269-70 (1992). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co. Ltd., 943 
F.3d 1243, 1257 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 145. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 644 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 146. Id. 
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“intermediaries.”147 The court noted that an intervening cause that severs 
the causal chain is “a later cause of independent origin that was not 
foreseeable.”148 Each drug at issue had been a prescription drug, which 
was required to be prescribed by a physician to a patient. Physicians don’t 
pay for these drugs, nor do patients with health insurance. The structure 
of the American health care system makes payment through TPPs not just 
foreseeable, but inevitable. The goals of these alleged fraudulent 
marketing schemes are either increasing sales or the price of the drug. The 
scheme “only becomes successful once [the pharmaceutical 
manufacturer] receives payment for the additional prescriptions [they] 
induced,” which is the very injury for which TPPs seek recovery.149 This 
is surely “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the 
injurious conduct alleged.”150  
The Supreme Court explained that misrepresentations do not need to 
be made directly to the TPP. So, as in Avandia, the Bridge decision 
precludes the argument that the causal chain is broken because the 
fraudulent marketing campaign was directed toward prescribing 
physicians.151 Again, physicians do not break the causal chain as they are 
merely intermediaries prescribing the drugs. The prescription of the drug 
did not cause the harm to the TPP; rather, the misrepresentation that 
induced the prescription caused the harm.  
Finally, the Holmes factors all weigh in favor of finding proximate 
cause in these types of cases. This Article has already discussed the first 
factor. Courts already must find at the pleading stage that the TPP has put 
forth sufficient evidence of damages for the case to move forward. The 
evidence again is usually shown using one of the two theories of damages, 
often bolstered by extensive expert testimony as seen in Neurontin.152 The 
TPP is the only entity that paid toward the purchase of the drug influenced 
by the fraudulent marketing scheme. Therefore, there is no threat of 
duplicative recoveries, as warned by the second factor. There is not a 
“more immediate victim” better positioned to bring suit.153 Finally, the 
third factor dealing with deterrence of wrongful conduct weighs heavily 
in the favor of TPPs. Indeed, TPPs are best suited to sue for economic 
damages because TPPs are the only parties that suffered economic loss. 
The Supreme Court’s precedent and the Holmes factors demonstrate 
that the First, Third, and Ninth Circuits came to the correct conclusion 
 
 147. Painters, 943 F.3d at 1257. 
 148. Id. (quoting Exxon Co. v. Sofec, 517 U.S. 830, 837 (1996)). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268-69 (1992). 
 151. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 658 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 152. In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 41-42 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 153. Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 658 (2008). 
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that proximate cause exists in cases where a TPP brings suit under civil 
RICO against a pharmaceutical company for a fraudulent marketing 
scheme. 
 iii. But-For Causation 
But-for causation is less hotly debated in the case law. The Holmes 
court required more than but-for causation because of the breadth of 
possible suits that may qualify. If only but-for causation was required, 
RICO may “be read to mean that a plaintiff is injured ‘by reason of’ a 
RICO violation, and therefore may recover, simply by showing that the 
defendant violated § 1962, the plaintiff was injured, and the defendant's 
violation was a ‘but-for’ cause of the plaintiff's injury.”154 This led the 
Supreme Court to require proximate cause as well. Yet, a discussion of 
how but-for causation is met in these cases is necessary, as it is still an 
essential part of civil RICO standing. 
The but-for causation question for civil RICO has been described as 
“whether, absent [the pharmaceutical manufacturer’s] fraud, [the TPP] 
would have paid for fewer off-label prescriptions.”155 Of course, in 
situations involving concealment of health risks, the question is as 
follows: but for the fraudulent marketing campaign promoting the drug’s 
safety, would the TPP have paid for a higher quantity of the drug or for a 
higher price than a cheaper, similar drug? In other words, but for the 
fraud, would the TPP have experienced the economic loss, regardless of 
how that loss came about? 
The answer to these questions is more straightforward than the 
proximate cause inquiry. The main showing required is a connection 
between the dissemination of the misrepresentations and a significant 
increase in sales. In Neurontin, prescription sales of the drug increased by 
sixty-two percent after physicians attended a medical education 
conference where the physicians were exposed to misrepresentations 
from the drug manufacturer.156 Then, when negative information about 
the safety of the drug was disseminated, the number of  prescription sales 
dropped by thirty-three percent.157 This shows that, but for the 
misrepresentations, the amount of prescriptions for the drug the TPP paid 
for would not have increased, and the TPP would not have incurred 
economic losses due to the drug. 
The Ninth Circuit opined, “logically, a plaintiff cannot even establish 
but-for causation if no one relied on the defendant’s alleged 
 
 154. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 265-66. 
 155. Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 34. 
 156. Id. at 41. 
 157. Id. 
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misrepresentation.” 158 Thus, a plaintiff must show the necessary reliance 
in order to show the effect that the misrepresentations had. The physicians 
necessarily would have to be induced by the misrepresentations. Just as 
the Court held in Bridge, even if the misrepresentations were made only 
to physicians and not the TPP, this indirect reliance still properly 
establishes proximate cause.159 
3. RICO Legislative History and Text 
The text and legislative history of the statute also supports this 
conclusion. The legislative history reveals that a civil remedy was 
introduced to reach the financial power of RICO violators.160 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers make these unlawful misrepresentations 
for one reason: profit. RICO lawsuits are incredibly expensive for these 
manufacturers. For example, the trial jury in the case of In Re Neurontin 
in the First Circuit rewarded the TPP $47,463,092, which the court trebled 
under the statute to $142,089,276.161 This large sum acts as a meaningful 
deterrence for the wrongdoings of the manufacturer, not only so this 
particular manufacturer ceases to execute fraudulent schemes, but for 
every other manufacturer in the similar line of business. This conclusion, 
allowing TPPs to sue in the situations discussed above, is powerful 
deterrence that satisfies the purpose of the civil RICO provision. 
C. Policy Considerations 
The Holmes court especially took into account deterring injurious 
conduct.162 The misrepresentations or concealments from drug 
manufacturers have serious, if not fatal, consequences that merit 
consideration. In Avandia, the risk of heart attacks and heart-related 
diseases increased when patients took the drug, but the manufacturers 
concealed this information and promoted the safety of the drug.163 In 
Painters, the drug caused an increased risk of bladder cancer, but the drug 
manufacturer failed to inform consumers of the risk.164 It is not far-fetched 
to say that these misrepresentations have likely cost people their lives or 
at least their quality of life. Thus, the motivation of deterring this conduct 
 
 158. Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co. Ltd., 943 
F.3d 1243, 1259 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original). 
 159. Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 658-59 (2008). 
 160. Tushar, supra note 20, at 1284. 
 161. Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 26. 
 162. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269-70 (1992). 
 163. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 635-65 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 164. Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm. Co. Ltd., 943 
F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2019). 
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is even stronger, and the finding of standing to sue is even more justified 
even though RICO only provides a remedy for financial harm.  
There is an asymmetry of information between drug manufacturers and 
consumers. More than sixty-six percent of adults in the United States use 
prescriptions drugs.165 That is over half of Americans who rely on what 
the physicians tell them. Thus, when the physician is given half-truths and 
misrepresentations by drug manufacturer representatives, the consumer 
suffers. The TPPs are in the best, most direct position, to sue for monetary 
damages. As the cases have made clear, these drug manufacturers are 
primarily profit-driven. In the end, the finding of standing for TPPs will 
protect millions of Americans from potentially concealed health risks or 
unsafe off-label prescription drug uses, assuming suing for monetary 
damages is sufficient deterrence. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
TPPs, such as health insurance companies, have standing to sue against 
drug manufacturers who misrepresent health risks or promote off-label 
usage of drugs. Proximate cause is established because there is a direct 
relation between the monetary loss incurred by the TPP and the conduct 
that constitutes a RICO violation, often a fraudulent marketing scheme. 
Physicians are merely foreseeable intermediaries who do not suffer any 
concrete monetary loss from the wrongdoings of drug manufacturers. The 
structure of the health care system makes it absolutely foreseeable and 
necessary for certain drugs to be prescribed to certain patients.  
Consequently, prescribing physicians will not break the causal chain, and 
TPPs can establish proximate cause. The integrity of health care depends 
on the truthfulness of drug manufacturers. Consumers deserve 
transparency and honesty during the prescription drug sales process that 
is an integral part of the American health care system.  
 
 
 
 165. See Prescription Drugs , supra note 2.  
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